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Abstract—This study deals with wage inequality in organization
and shows the relationship between ICT and wage in organization.
To do so, we incorporate ICT’s factors in organization into our
model. ICT’s factors are efﬁciencies of Enterprise Resource
Planning (ERP), Computer Assisted Design/Computer Assisted
Manufacturing (CAD/CAM), and NETWORK. The improvement of
ICT’s factors decrease the learning cost to solve problem pertaining
to the hierarchy in organization. The improvement of NETWORK
increases the wage inequality within workers and decreases within
managers and entrepreneurs. The improvements of CAD/CAM and
ERP increases the wage inequality within all agent, and partially
increase it between the agents in hierarchy.
Keywords—Endogenous economic growth, ICT, inequality, capital
accumulation, technology.
I. INTRODUCTION
AS [13] pointed out, inequality has widened aroundthe world. Reference [13] mentions that inequality has
stemmed from the causes of two types. One is that the
rate of return for capital (r) is greater than the economic
growth rate (g). Another is the wage (income) inequality in
organization. And [12] mentions that technological progress
led to higher wage differentials, so that advances in
information and communication technologies in particular
have been more beneﬁcial for workers with higher skills.
Taking into consideration the above, this study deals with
the cause of wage inequality of the latter type in [13], and
incorporates ICT factors in organization into our model.
Recently ICT has strong inﬂuence to the various aspects. For
example, it is said that the evolving form of new innovation,
Industry 4.0, has succeeded to steam engine, electrical
power and automation. As it enhances the competitiveness
of the manufacturing industry in Germany, the Berlin aims
to retain the factories within the country with the new
innovation. Efﬁciency is enhanced by the fusion with ICT
and manufacturing technology. Furthermore, we illustrate
that by connection with internet between manufacturing
devices and factories production management and orders are
fully automated. In addition to this, rate of operation of
manufacturing devices is able to automatically controlled by
internet with correspondence to situation of shipment.
Many literatures have theoretically mentioned that IT/ICT
brings about the impacts to economies [3], [10], [11], [7], [14].
However, almost all of these precedent researches analyze the
impacts of IT/ICT from macroeconomic point of view, but
not from microeconomic point of view, such as from ﬁrms
and industries.
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Among others, [2] analyzes the role of ICT in organization
(ﬁrm), and how to inﬂuence the ﬁrm organization by ICT. They
present a simpliﬁed version of [4], and introduce hierarchy
in ﬁrm organization. Regarding the hierarchy, there are head
quarter and factory, and they stratify the ﬁrm organization
into three type agents, central managers at corporate head
quarters, local managers and workers at site. There central
managers have decision making as to non-production, local
managers at factories have decision making as to production,
and workers engage in production at factories. The costs for
acquiring knowledge and communication are reduced by ICT.
Problems in each layer are solved by acquiring knowledge
and communication. According to [2], the technologies
have at least two distinct components. First, through the
spread of cheap storage and processing of data, information
stored in database is becoming cheaper to access. Second,
through the spread of cheap wired (IP-based) and wireless
communications, agents ﬁnd it easier to communicate with
each other (e.g. e-mail and mobile devices).
The ﬁrst one includes two types of technology. The
ﬁrst type is Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP) relating to
non-production decisions. ERP system increases dramatically
the availability of information to decision makers in
the company, that is they reduce the cost of acquiring
information to solve a problem. The second one is
Computer Assisted Design/Computer Assisted Manufacturing
(CAD/CAM) relating to production decisions. Acquiring
knowledge ERP systems are able to make decisions about
production and its investment and employment. Falls in
acquiring knowledge costs enlarge the span of control for
decision making of local managers and production workers at
plant site, and prompt organization to decentralized decision
making.
The second one is the communication technology to
centralize decision making. A key technology innovation
affecting communication is growth of network and
connectedness. Communication costs are able to be reduced
through NETWORK, and falls in communication costs lead
to more decision making at head quarters and proceed to
centralization. Reference [2] indicates that ICT/IT inﬂuence
corporate organization. However it takes the wage as
exogenous, so that they do not refer to the wage inequality.
Although [5] does not use the term ICT, it is possible
that the progress of ICT reduces communication cost, and
with two layers of organization and agents to be differ
in knowledge, they analyze how to inﬂuence wages of
workers, self-employments and managers through falls of
communication cost. As a result of numerical calculation, its
falls decreases the shares of self-employment and manager,
increases the share of worker and decreases the wage
inequality within workers. In addition, it widens the wage
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inequality between workers and managers. In [6], they deal
with multiple layers in organization and analyze the wage
inequality.
As empirical studies, there are many literatures, such as [1]
and [8]. Reference [8] analyzes the critical factor for making
use of ICT in Ireland with probit method, and indicates that
the services of computer utilization and online are related to
ﬁrm scale, human capital, management, technology, clerks,
and export intensity. Reference [9] shows that with using data
for United States from 1970 to 2010, the progress of ICT
causes the income inequality. More concretely, it indicates that
the proportion of the upper decile of income in that country
increases in accordance with the progress of ICT, and its
tendency started from about the middle of 1980. Furthermore
it shows that the intrinsic characteristic in ICT (skill biased
technology) is in favor of upper decile of income. Reference
[1] shows that with using data of Italian industry from 1995
to 1997 the productivity of ﬁrms with many replacement
of investment is higher than the one with less replacement
by regression analysis, and ICT investment has 8 times as
productivity as non-ICT investment. This indicates that ICT
investment much inﬂuences ﬁrms on various aspects.
To clarify the wage inequality in the framework of [2], we
incorporate the cost function, which is based on [6], into the
model of [2], and we analyze wage inequality in the changes of
situation for information and communication technologies. In
addition to this, we consider the externality for agents behavior
in organization (for example X-Efﬁciency) and analyze wage
inequality between agents.
II. THE MODEL
This model is a partial equilibrium one and based on [2]
and [6]. In these studies, agents of heterogeneous ability
learn to solve problems, choose an occupation, and a team
to join. Agents supply some constant time, which may be
used in production or helping others solve problem. Regarding
organization, we consider the two cases, two layers and three
layers in organization. At ﬁrst, we consider the model where
ﬁrm or economy consists of two layers (Case 1: layer 0 (l0),
layer 1 (l1)) or three layers (Case 2: layer 0 (l0), layer 1
(l1), layer 2 (l2)). Layer 0 (l0) comprises of workers, such as
factory workers, layer 1 (l1) managers of decision makers for
production such as plant manager, layer 2 (l2) entrepreneurs
of decision makers for non-production.
A. Production and Knowledge
Based on the concept of [6], we speciﬁed the production
and knowledge as follows. Production requires labor
and knowledge. Agents are production workers, managers
and entrepreneurs. They spend time in production and
non-production, and solve the problems they confront in order
to produce. Problems are ranked by the likelihood that they
will be confronted, so that problem z is associated with
a continuous density f(z) ∈ [0, z¯], and c.d.f. F(z), where
f ′(z) < 0. z¯ is the maximum value of problem. Solving
problems requires knowledge. We deﬁned the proportion of
problems a worker can solve as q = F (z˜). Then z˜ = z(q),
where z(·) = F−1(·), and so z′ > 0, z′′ > 0. Thus z(q)
denotes the knowledge required to solve a proportion of q of
problems.
B. Cost, Information Technology and Externality
Agents differ in their cognitive ability so that higher
ability agents incur lower earning costs. We assume that the
distribution of ability in the population can be described by a
continuous density function, α ∼ φ(α), with support in [0,1].
Especially, we deﬁne ability so that the cost of learning to
solve an interval of problems of length 1 is given by
c0(α; t0, β0) = t0 − β0α for α ∈ A0M (1)
c1(α; t1, β1) = t1 − β1α for α ∈ A1M (2)
c2(α; t2, β2) = t2 − β2α for α ∈ A2E (3)
Cost functions are piecewise continuous ones. A decrease
in ti(i = 0, 1, 2) represents an improvement in information
technology that decreases the cost of learning (e.g. a
technology that decreases the cost of accessing knowledge,
such as cheaper database storage and research). The cost of
information technology t0 is related to CAD, t1 to CAM, and
t2 to ERP. An increase in βi (i=0,1,2) presents an improvement
of external effect with ability in the corresponding layer (e.g.
X-Efﬁciency: efﬁciency being produced by agents in their
layer and for working together by using ICT apparatus and
software).
C. Communication and Organization
Agents can communicate their knowledge to others,
and thus help them solve problems. Thus, agents form
organizations where several individuals combine their time and
knowledge to produce together. These organizations take the
form of knowledge hierarchies. On layer level (l0) of these
teams is set of equally knowledgeable production workers,
who learn the most routine problems and spend all of their
time in production, and generate one problem each. Above
them are layers of managers and entrepreneurs. Workers draw
a problem per their own time (some constant time). Managers
and entrepreneurs do not engage in production, and thus do
not draw problems. If workers can solve it, they produce;
otherwise, they ask for help to the managers in the layer
immediately above them (l1), in which these managers incur
a communication cost of h units of time (0 < h < h¯, h¯
denotes some constant). If these managers know how to solve
the problem, they solve it; otherwise, they pass it on the layer
immediately above them (l2), in which these entrepreneurs
incur a communication cost of h units of time like managers.
Higher layer has smaller number of agents than the previous
one, since only a fraction of problems are passed on. The
communication cost h is related to NETWORK.
Consider an organization with n0 production workers with
knowledge q0 = F (z0); and n1 problem solving managers
in layer l1, with knowledge q1. Workers in production draw
one problem each, and solve in expectation a fraction q0 of
them. Hence, they pass on a fraction, 1− q0, of all problems.
Managers in layer 1 are thus asked to solve n0(1 − q0)
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problems, which they can address in n0(1−q0)h units of time.
Since all agents have same units of time available, the number
of managers in layer 1 (l1) is hn0(1− q0) = n1. Managers in
layer 1 can only solve a fraction q1 of problems, and pass up
to the next layer (l2) n0(1− q1) problems. Thus, the number
of entrepreneurs in layer 2 (l2) is hn0(1 − q1) = n2, and
entrepreneurs can only solve a fraction q2 of problems, that
is, a problem is solved with probability q2. Therefore, expected
total output y produced the organization is given as below.
y = q2n0 (4)
D. Firm’s Problem
In this section, we assume that a hierarchy is integrated in a
ﬁrm, and mention the proﬁt maximization problem for a ﬁrm.
Proﬁts of a hierarchy are given by production minus labor
costs, since we normalize the price of output to unity. Thus, the
problem of a hierarchy of two (three) layers that faces a wage
schedule, w(α), is to choose the ability α, knowledge q, and
number of agents in each layer of the team n. Let L denote the
number of layer (L=1,2,3). Proﬁts are given by output minus
wages, w(α), and learning costs, nlclz(ql) (l = 0, 1, 2). Here
we just mention the ﬁrm’ problem for L = 3. The expected
proﬁts of hierarchy are
Π(L = 3) = max[ql,nl,αl]2l=0 q2n0 − n2
(
c2(α2; t2)z(q2)
+ w(α2)
)− n1(c1(α1; t1)z(q1) + w(α1))
− n0
(
c0(α0; t0)z(q0) + w(α0)
)
(5)
subject to time constraints for the different layers of managers
and entrepreneurs,
hn0(1− q1) = n2 (6)
hn0(1− q0) = n1 (7)
Then using (5)-(7), we obtain the ﬁrst order conditions
(f.o.c) for proﬁt maximization problem as:
∂Π
∂q1
= h
(
c2(α2, ; t2)z(q2) + w(α2)
)
− h((1− q0)c1(α1; t1)z′(q1) = 0 (focq1) (8)
∂Π
∂q2
= 1− h(1− q1)c2(α2; t2)z′(q2) = 0, (focq2)(9)
∂Π
∂αi
= −c′i(αi; ti)z(qi)− w′(αi) = 0 (i = 0, 1, 2)(10)
III. EQUILIBRIUM
In this section, we analyze an equilibrium in this economy.
An equilibrium allocation speciﬁes the sets of agents in
different occupation, the assignment of agents to supervisor,
and the wage schedule that support this assignment.
Based on [6], we mention the labor market equilibrium
condition brieﬂy. In equilibrium, the supply of workers or
managers for a corresponding set of abilities at each layer
is equal to the demand for these workers or managers by
managers or entrepreneurs at each layer. Let n(α) denote
the total number of workers or managers hired as direct
subordinates of managers or entrepreneurs with ability α
in equilibrium. Let a(α) denote the ability of the manager
or entrepreneur assigned to an employee of ability α in
equilibrium. In order for a(α) to be deﬁned over the whole
set of abilities, [0, 1], we set a(α) = 1 for all entrepreneurs.
Let AS denote the set of agents with subordinates and let AM
denote the set of agents who are not at the top of hierarchy.
α ∈ A0M agents become workers and α ∈ A1M do managers.
Then, labor markets clear if for every α ∈ AM = A0M∪A1M ,
∫ α∩AM
0∩AM
φ(α′)dα′ =
∫ a(α)∩AS
a(0)∩AS
n(α′)
n(a(α′))
φ(α′)dα′ (11)
where AS ≡ [0, 1]\A0M . The left-hand side is the supply
of employees in the interval [0, α] The right-hand side is
the demand for employees by manager and entrepreneurs in
the interval [a(0), a(α]: managers and entrepreneurs of ability
α hire n(α) employees, and there are n(a(α)) of them.
The deﬁnition of equilibrium in this setup is then given by
Deﬁnition 1.
Deﬁnition 1: A competitive equilibrium is
• for α ∈ A1M agents become managers of layer 1 (l1),
workers of layer 0 (l0) for α ∈ A0M , and entrepreneurs
of layer 2 (l2) for α ∈ A2E ,
• a wage function,w(α) : [0, 1] → R+,
• an assignment function, a(α):[0,1] → AS and a(α) = 1
for α ∈ A2E .
• a knowledge function q(α) : [0, 1] → [0, 1]1
and
• a total number of direct subordinates of agents with
ability α, n(α) : AS → R+, that (i)Firms choose the
skill of their employees, knowledge, and their number, to
maximize (5).
(ii)Firms make zero proﬁts.
(iii)Labor markets clear, that is, (11) is satisﬁed for
α ∈ AM .
A. Assignment
On layers in organization high ability managers hire high
ability agents so as to be shield from solving easy and common
problems. Hiring better workers allows managers to specialize
in solving only the harder problems that lower layer agents
cannot solve. Driving the labor market condition (11) with
Leibniz’s Rule, we obtain
∂a(α)
∂α
=
n(a(a(α)))
n(a(α))
φ(α)
φ(a(α))
for α ∈ AM (12)
Following [6], we obtain the assignment function as below.
∂a(α)
∂α
=
1− q(α)
1− q(a−1(α))
φ(α)
φ(a(α))
for α ∈ AM\A0M ,
(13)
or
∂a(α)
∂α
= h(1− q(α)) φ(α)
φ(a(α))
for α ∈ A0M (14)
1Although theoretically it is aceptable that q(α) : [0, 1]→ [0, 1], q(α) = 1
means that z →∞. Therefore it is practical that q(α) : [0, 1]→ [0, b], b is
constant and 0 < b < 1.
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Equations (13 and 14) are a collection of ordinary different
equations that determine the functions a(α) given some initial
values.
B. Procedure of Existence of Assignment and Wages at
Equilibrium
In this section, we show the procedure of existence of
assignment. An equilibrium can be constructed as follows.
1) Set L = 2 (Case 1:workers and managers) or L = 3
(Case 2:workers, managers and entrepreneurs).
2) In Case 1, we ﬁx α01(α10) by using (14), through
reiteration to satisfying the labor market (11).
3) In Case 2, we ﬁx 0 < α01(α10) < α11(α20).
4) Set the initial value of w(0) 2.
5) In Case 2, based on the ﬁxed value of α01(α10), we
ﬁxed the ﬁnal value of α11(α20) by using (13), through
reiteration to satisfy the labor market (11).
6) After the ﬁxed values α01(α10) and α11(α20), we obtain
the wages for each layer by using (1)-(3) and (10) 3.
C. Theoretical Results
With the above results, we perform the statics analysis in
equilibrium. In accordance with [2], ﬁrstly we show the statics
results of two layers model (Case 1) which comprises workers
and managers. Afterwards we deal with three layers model
(Case 2). In Appendix the calculation for statics analysis for
two and three layers is shown.
The results of statics analysis for Case 1 are as follows.
sign
⎛
⎜⎝
∂q0
∂h
∂q1
∂h
⎞
⎟⎠ = ( < 0 or > 0< 0 or > 0
)
(15)
sign
⎛
⎜⎝
∂q0
∂t0
∂q1
∂t0
⎞
⎟⎠ = ( < 0
< 0
)
(16)
sign
⎛
⎜⎝
∂q0
∂t1
∂q1
∂t1
⎞
⎟⎠ = ( < 0 or > 0
< 0 or > 0
)
(17)
sign
⎛
⎜⎝
∂q0
∂β0
∂q1
∂β0
⎞
⎟⎠ = ( > 0
> 0
)
(18)
sign
⎛
⎜⎝
∂q0
∂β1
∂q1
∂β1
⎞
⎟⎠ = ( < 0 or > 0
< 0 or > 0
)
(19)
2In Simulation of this paper we set w(0) = 1.
3For the thresholds, such as α01(α10) and α11(α20), we assume that ﬁrms
make a decision to choose workers or managers, (managers or entrepreneurs)
at thresholds, taking into consideration their backgrounds such as curriculum
vitae, personality and school achievements an so on, in addition to their
abilities.
Regarding the span of control SM =
n0
n1
=
1
h(1− q0) , we
obtain the following results of sign.
∂SM
∂h
= < 0 or > 0 (20)
∂SM
∂t0
= < 0 (21)
∂SM
∂t1
= < 0 or > 0 (22)
∂SM
∂β0
= > 0 (23)
∂SM
∂β1
= < 0 or > 0 (24)
From the above results, as to communication cost h
and acquiring knowledge cost of managers t1, we obtain
the ambiguous outcome in comparison with [2]. Regarding
acquiring cost of workers t0, we have same outcome for
workers as [2]. As to the span of control SM , we have
almost the same result as [2]. Then we obtain the following
proposition.
Proposition 1: The improvement of information technology
for workers t0 increases the knowledge for workers and
managers. That is, q0 and q1 are decreasing in t0. The
improvement of communication technology h and information
technology for managers t1 lead to the ambiguous outcomes
for knowledge in layer 0 and 1. The improvement of
externality for workers β0 increases the knowledge for
both workers and managers. However the improvement of
externality for managers β1 is ambiguous to knowledge.
The changes of communication technology h, information
technology for managers t1, and externality for managers β1
have the ambiguous outcomes for SM . The improvement of
information technology for workers t0 increases the span of
control SM . The deterioration of externality for worker β0
increases the span of control for managers SM .
Next we show the results of statics analysis for three
layers (Case 2). However we just mention the results of the
relationship between managers and entrepreneurs. The results
are as follows.
sign
⎛
⎜⎝
∂q1
∂h
∂q2
∂h
⎞
⎟⎠ = ( < 0< 0
)
(25)
sign
⎛
⎜⎝
∂q1
∂t1
∂q2
∂t1
⎞
⎟⎠ = ( < 0
< 0
)
(26)
sign
⎛
⎜⎝
∂q1
∂t2
∂q2
∂t2
⎞
⎟⎠ = ( < 0 or > 0
< 0 or > 0
)
(27)
sign
⎛
⎜⎝
∂q1
∂β1
∂q2
∂β1
⎞
⎟⎠ = ( > 0
> 0
)
(28)
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sign
⎛
⎜⎝
∂q1
∂β2
∂q2
∂β2
⎞
⎟⎠ = ( < 0 or > 0< 0 or > 0
)
(29)
Regarding the span of control SM =
n0
n1
=
1
h(1− q0) and
SE =
1− q0
1− q1 for managers and entrepreneurs, we obtain the
following results of sign.
∂SM
∂h
= < 0 (30)
∂SE
∂h
= < 0 (31)
∂SM
∂t1
= 0 (32)
∂SE
∂t1
= < 0 (33)
∂SM
∂t2
= 0 (34)
∂SE
∂t2
= < 0 or > 0 (35)
∂SM
∂β1
= 0 (36)
∂SE
∂β1
= > 0 (37)
∂SM
∂β2
= 0 (38)
∂SE
∂β2
= < 0 or > 0 (39)
Regarding the costs for communication h and information
technologies for managers t1, we obtain the same outcome as
[6]. Then we obtain the following proposition.
Proposition 2: The improvement of communication
technology h and information technology for managers t1
increases the knowledge of entrepreneurs and managers. That
is, q1 and q2 are decreasing in h and t1. The improvement
of the externality for managers β1 increases the knowledge
of entrepreneurs and managers, q1 and q2. The improvement
information technology t2 and externality for entrepreneurs
β2 leads to ambiguous to knowledge. The improvement of
communication technology h increases the both span of
control. And improvement of information technology for
managers t1 increases the span of control for entrepreneurs
SE , but the improvement of externality for managers β1
increases SE . The improvements of information technology
and the externality for entrepreneurs, t2 and β2, are ambiguous
to SE .
IV. SIMULATION: EFFECT OF ICT ON WAGE AND
ORGANIZATION
With the results mentioned above, we study examples with
an exponential density of problems, f(z) = λe−λz and
uniform distribution of workers ability, α ∼ U [0, 1]. Moreover,
in all exercises, we use λ = 2 which is cited from [6]. The
software to be used is MATLAB. Also we set the initial value
of wage to 1.
A. The Data: Values of Parameters
The parameters of Baseline and Modiﬁed Simulations for
each case to be used are shown on Tables IA and IB.
B. The Procedure of Knowledge at Threshold for Wage
In the Modiﬁed Simulations, regarding the threshold for
wages, such as the threshold between workers and managers
or managers and entrepreneurs, we follow the procedure as
mentioned below except a parameter of communication h.
Basic concept of this procedure is that wage level reﬂects the
corresponding ability or knowledge. When wage is less than
the initial wage level (w0), wage is set at w0 = 1.
1) Case 1
a) As to information technology t0(t1) we take the
knowledge α which satisﬁes the condition: The
minimum(maximum) wage for managers(workers)
in Baseline Simulation is equal to the wage of
workers(managers) in Modiﬁed Simulation.
b) As to externality β0(β1) we take the
knowledge α which satisﬁes the condition: The
maximum(minimum) wage for workers(managers)
in Baseline Simulation is equal to the wage of
managers(workers) in Modiﬁed Simulation.
TABLE IA
PARAMETERS OF BASELINE AND MODIFIED SIMULATIONS
Case h t0 t1 t2
Case 1(Baseline)@ 2.7 0.6 0.4 -
Case 1(Mod.1) 2.5 0.6 0.4 -
Case 1(Mod.2) 2.7 0.5 0.4 -
Case 1(Mod.3) 2.7 0.6 0.3 -
Case 1(Mod.4) 2.7 0.6 0.4 -
Case 1(Mod.5) 2.7 0.6 0.4 -
Case 2(Baseline)@ 4.66 0.6 0.4 0.3
Case 2(Mod.1) 4.5 0.6 0.4 0.3
Case 2(Mod.2) 4.66 0.5 0.4 0.3
Case 2(Mod.3) 4.66 0.6 0.5 0.3
Case 2(Mod.4) 4.66 0.6 0.4 0.2
Case 2(Mod.5) 4.66 0.6 0.4 0.3
Case 2(Mod.6) 4.66 0.6 0.4 0.3
Case 2(Mod.7) 4.66 0.6 0.4 0.3
TABLE IB
PARAMETERS OF BASELINE AND MODIFIED SIMULATIONS
Case β0 β1 β2
Case 1(Baseline) 2.0 2.5 -
Case 1(Mod.1) 2.0 2.5 -
Case 1(Mod.2) 2.0 2.5 -
Case 1(Mod.3) 2.0 2.5 -
Case 1(Mod.4) 1.9 2.5 -
Case 1(Mod.5) 2.0 2.4 -
Case 2(Baseline) 2.0 2.5 3.0
Case 2(Mod.1) 2.0 2.5 3.0
Case 2(Mod.2) 2.0 2.5 3.0
Case 2(Mod.3) 2.0 2.5 3.0
Case 2(Mod.4) 2.0 2.5 3.0
Case 2(Mod.5) 1.9 2.5 3.0
Case 2(Mod.6) 2.0 2.4 3.0
Case 2(Mod.7) 2.0 2.5 2.9
2) Case 2
a) As to t0 we follow the procedure of t0 in Case 1.
b) As to t1 we take the knowledge α01 =
α10(α11 = α20) which satisﬁes the condition:
The minimum wage for managers(entrepreneurs)
in Baseline Simulation is equal to the wage of
managers(entrepreneurs) in Modiﬁed Simulation.
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c) As to t2 we take the knowledge α11 = α20 which
satisﬁes the condition: The minimum wage for
entrepreneurs in Baseline Simulation is equal to
the wage of entrepreneurs in Modiﬁed Simulation.
d) As to β0 we follow the procedure of β0 in Case 1.
e) As to β1 we take the knowledge α01 =
α10(α11 = α20) which satisﬁes the condition:
The minimum(maximum) wage for managers in
Baseline Simulation is equal to the wage of
managers(entrepreneurs) in Modiﬁed Simulation.
f) As to β2 we take the knowledge α11 = α20 which
satisﬁes the condition: The minimum wage for
entrepreneurs in Baseline Simulation is equal to
the wage of entrepreneurs in Modiﬁed Simulation.
By using the parameters shown on Tables IA and I, we
simulate the wages for both cases.
For both cases, with the Baseline Simulations, we compare
the Modiﬁed Simulations where the parameters values are
changed from the Baseline Simulation in equilibrium.
In the Tables IIA, IIIB, we summarize the results for
Baseline and Modiﬁed Simulations for both Cases.
Tables IIA and B show the wage inequality within the agents
in the same layer. The values are the ratio of the wage for
agents with the highest ability relative to the one for agents
with the lowest ability. The values at lower row (the value
with parenthesis) are ratio of the value of Modiﬁed Simulation
relative to the one of Baseline Simulation.
From Tables IIA and IIB, we obtain the following results.
Result 1 (for both Cases):
1) In Baseline Simulation, the inequality within managers
is higher (the highest) than the one within workers (of
them all).
2) The improvement of communication (decrease of h)
increases the inequality within worker in comparison
with the one within managers or entrepreneurs.
Result 2 (for Case 1):
1) Improvement of information technology for workers
(decrease of t0) increases the inequality within workers
and decreases the one within managers.
2) Improvement of information technology for manager
(decrease of t1) decreases the inequality within workers,
and increases the one within managers.
3) Deterioration of externality of worker (decrease of β0)
decreases the inequality within workers and increases
the one within managers.
4) Deterioration of externality of managers (decrease of β1)
increases the inequality within workers and decreases the
one within managers.
TABLE IIA
WAGE INEQUALITY RATIO WITHIN LAYER (CASE 1)
Employee Workers Managers
Baseline Simulation 1.23 1.46
Communication (h): 1.56 1.09
Decrease of h (1.27) (0.75)
Information Techn.(t0): 1.39 1.29
Decrease of t0 (1.13) (0.88)
Information Tech.(t1): 1.10 1.69
Decrease of t1 (0.89) (1.10)
Externality(β0): 1.10 1.66
Decrease of β0 (0.89) (1.14)
Externality(β1): 1.26 1.40
Decrease of β1 (1.02) (0.96)
TABLE IIB
WAGE INEQUALITY RATIO WITHIN LAYER (CASE 2)
Employee Workers Managers Entrepre.
Baseline Simulation 1.22 1.34 1.10
Communication(h): 1.33 1.23 1.07
Decrease of h (1.09) (0.92) (0.97)
Information Tech.(t0): 1.39 1.31 1.10
Decrease of t0 (1.14) (0.98) (1.00)
Information Tech.(t1): 1.24 1.35 1.07
Increase of t1 (1.02) (1.01) (0.97)
Information Tech.(t2): 1.22 1.32 1.12
Decrease of t2 (1.00) (0.99) (1.02)
Externality(β0): 1.11 1.52 1.10
Decrease of β0 (0.91) (1.13) (1.00)
Externality(β1): 1.24 1.16 1.26
Decrease of β1 (1.02) (0.87) (1.15)
Externality(β2): 1.22 1.40 1.05
Decrease of β2 (1.00) (1.04) (0.95)
Result 3 (for Case 2):
1) Improvement of information technology for workers
(decrease of t0) increases the inequality within workers
and decreases the one within managers. However, it has
no effect to the inequality within entrepreneurs.
2) Deterioration of information technology for manager
(increase of t1) increases the inequality within
workers and managers, and decreases the one within
entrepreneurs.
3) Improvement of information technology for entrepreneur
(decrease of t2) increases the inequality within
entrepreneurs, and decreases the one within managers.
However, it has no effect to the inequality within
workers.
4) Deterioration of externality of worker (decrease of β0)
decreases the inequality within workers and increases
the one within managers. However, it has no effect to
the inequality within entrepreneurs.
5) Deterioration of externality of managers (decrease of β1)
decreases the inequality within managers and increases
the ones within workers and entrepreneurs.
6) Deterioration of externality for entrepreneur (increase of
β2) decreases the inequality within entrepreneurs and
increases the one within managers. However, it has no
effect to the inequality within workers.
Tables IIIA and B show the wage inequality ratios between
the different layers. For Baseline Simulations of the both cases,
the values without parenthesis are the ratios for the lowest
ability and the ones with parenthesis are the ratios for the
highest ability in different layer. For Modiﬁed Simulation,
the values of the ﬁrst row are the ratios for the lowest
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ability (values without parenthesis) and the ones for the
highest ability (values with the parenthesis). Then in the
second row, we indicate the wage inequality ratios between
Modiﬁed and Baseline Simulation at lowest ability (values
without parenthesis) and at the highest ability (values with
the parenthesis).
TABLE IIIA
WAGE INEQUALITY RATIO BETWEEN LAYERS (CASE 1)
Upper Layer/Lower Layer M/W
Baseline Simulation 1.40(1.67)
Communication(h): 1.87(1.41)
Decrease of h 1.34(0.84)
Information Techn.(t0): 1.58 (1.47)
Decrease of t0 1.23(0.88)
Information Tech.(t1): 1.22(1.87)
Decrease of t1 0.87(1.12)
Externality(β0): 1.23(1.85)
Decrease of β0 0.88(1.11)
Externality(β1): 1.40(1.56)
Decrease of β1 1.00(0.93)
TABLE IIIB
WAGE INEQUALITY RATIO BETWEEN LAYERS (CASE 2)
Upper Layer/Lower Layer M/W E/M
Baseline Simulation 1.39(1.53) 1.55(1.27)
Communication(h): 1.55(1.44) 1.43(1.23)
Decrease of h 1.12(0.94) 0.92(0.97)
Information Tech.(t0): 1.42(1.34) 1.51(1.27)
Decrease of t0 1.02(0.88) 0.97(1.00)
Information Tech.(t1): 1.39(1.51) 1.60(1.51)
Increase of t1 1.00(0.99) 1.03(1.19)
Information Tech.(t2): 1.39(1.51) 1.53(1.29)
Decrease of of t2 1.00(0.99) 0.99(1.02)
Externality(β0): 1.23(1.68) 1.75(1.27)
Decrease of β0 0.88(1.10) 1.13(1.00)
Externality(β1): 1.40(1.31) 1.35(1.46)
Decrease of β1 1.01(0.86) 0.87(1.15)
Externality(β2): 1.39 (1.59) 1.54 (1.15)
Decrease of β2 1.00(1.04) 0.99(0.91)
From Table III we obtain the following results:
Result 4 (for Case 1):
1) For Baseline Simulation the inequality at the highest
ability is greater than the one at the lowest ability.
2) As to the improvement of communication (decrease of
h), the inequality at the lowest ability is greater than the
one at the highest ability. The inequality at lowest ability
increases and the one at the highest ability decreases.
3) As to the improvement of information technology for
worker (decrease of t0), the inequality at the lowest
ability is greater than the one at the highest ability. The
inequality at the lowest ability increases and the one at
the highest ability decreases.
4) As to the improvement of information technology for
manager (decrease of t1), the inequality at the highest
ability is greater than the one at the lowest ability. The
inequality at the lowest ability decreases and the one at
the highest ability increases.
5) As to the deterioration of externality for worker
(decrease of β0), the inequality at the highest ability is
greater than the one at the lowest ability. The inequality
at the lowest ability decreases and the one at the highest
ability increases.
6) As to the deterioration of externality for manager
(decrease of β1), the inequality at the highest ability is
greater than the one at the lowest ability. The inequality
at the lowest ability has no change and the one at the
highest ability decreases.
Result 5 (for Case 2):
1) For Baseline Simulation the inequality at the lowest
ability between entrepreneur and managers is the
greatest in all the ones between the different layers. The
inequality at the highest ability between entrepreneur
and manager is the smallest in all the ones between the
different layers.
2) As to the improvement of communication (decrease of
h), the inequality at the lowest ability between managers
and workers is the greatest in all the ones between
the different layers. The inequality at the lowest ability
between managers and workers increases and the other
ones decrease.
3) As to the improvement of information technology for
worker (decrease of t0), the inequality at the lowest
ability between entrepreneurs and managers is the
greatest in all the ones between the different layers.
The inequality at lowest ability between managers and
workers increases and the other ones decrease or not
change.
4) As to the deterioration of information technology for
manager (increase of t1), the inequality at the lowest
ability between entrepreneurs and managers is the
greatest in all the ones between the different layers.
The inequalities between entrepreneurs and managers
increase and the one at the highest ability between
managers and workers decrease and the one at the lowest
ability between managers and workers has no change.
5) As to the improvement of information technology for
entrepreneur (decrease of t2), the inequality at the
lowest ability between entrepreneurs and managers is the
greatest in all the ones between the different layers. The
inequality at the highest ability between entrepreneurs
and managers increases and the ones at the highest
ability between managers and worker and at the lowest
ability between entrepreneurs and managers decrease,
and one at the lowest ability between managers and
workers has no change.
6) As to the improvement of externality for worker
(increase of β0) the inequality at the lowest ability
between entrepreneurs and managers is the greatest in all
the ones between the different layers. The inequalities
at the highest ability between managers and workers
and at the lowest ability between entrepreneurs and
managers increase. Then the inequality at the lowest
ability between managers and worker decreases and the
one at the highest ability between entrepreneurs and
managers has no change.
7) As to the deterioration of externality for manager
(increase of β1) the inequality at the highest ability
between entrepreneurs and managers is the greatest in all
the ones between the different layers. The inequalities at
the lowest ability between manager and worker and at
the highest ability between entrepreneurs and managers
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increase. Then the inequalities at the highest ability
between managers and worker and at the lowest ability
between entrepreneurs and managers decrease.
8) As to the deterioration of externality for entrepreneur
(decrease of β2), the inequality at the highest ability
between manager and worker is the greatest in all the
ones between the different layers. The inequality at the
highest ability between managers and workers increases
and the ones between entrepreneurs and managers
decrease, The inequality at the lowest ability between
managers and workers has no change.
V. CONCLUSION
In this study we develop our model based on [2] and [6].
Our ﬁnal goal is to clarify the role of ICT for wage inequality.
Regarding the theoretical results, the improvement of
information technology (CAD/CAM) increases the knowledge
of workers and managers, and the span of controls for
managers (Case 1) and the one for entrepreneurs (Case 2)
increases. The improvement of communication (NETWORK)
increases the knowledge and span of control for managers
(Case 1 and 2) and for entrepreneurs (Case 2). The
improvement of externality increases the knowledge for
worker (Case 1) and for managers (Case 2).
Regarding the simulation for wages, the improvement of
communication (NETWORK) increases the inequality within
workers and decreases the inequality within managers and
entrepreneurs. The improvement of information technology
(CAD/CAM) increases the inequality within workers (Case
1 and Case 2) and within managers (Case 2), and the
improvement of information technology (ERP) increases the
inequality within entrepreneurs (Case 2). The improvement
of externality at each layer increases the corresponding
inequality within the agents (Case 1 and Case 2). Furthermore
the improvements of communication (NETWORK) and
information technology (CAD) increase the inequality at
the lowest ability between managers and workers (Case 1
and Case 2). The improvement of information technology
(CAM) increases the inequality at the highest ability between
managers and workers (Case 1 and Case 2). The improvement
of information technology (ERP) increases the inequality at
the highest ability between entrepreneurs and managers. The
improvement of externality increases the inequalities at the
highest ability between managers and workers (Case 1) and
between entrepreneurs and managers (Case 2).
From the above results, ICT is strongly related to
the inequality in organization, since improvement of
NETWORK/CAD/CAM/ERP increases the inequality within
the agents at large. Then the improvement of externality
at each layer increases the corresponding inequality within
the agents. As a further research, the most inﬂuential factor
among ICT’s factor is determined through the simulations, and
an empirical analysis using actual data like [2] have to be
performed.
APPENDIX
A. Two Layers: Workers and Managers
The proﬁt maximization problem is speciﬁed as:
Π(1) = max[ql,nl,αl]1l=0 q1n0
− n1
(
c1(α1; t1)z(q1) + w(α1)
)
− n0
(
c0(α0; t0)z(q0) + w(α0)
)
, (40)
subject to time constraints for the different layer of managers,
hn0(1− q0) = n1. (41)
We mention the ﬁrst order conditions as:
∂Π
∂q0
= hn0
(
c1(α1, t1)z(q1) + w(α1)
)
− n0c0(α0; t0)z′(q0) = 0, (focq0) (42)
∂Π
∂q1
= n0 − hn0(1− q0)c1(α1; t1)z′(q1)
= 0, (focq1) (43)
∂Π
∂αi
= −ci(αi; ti)z(qi)− w′(αi) = 0. (i = 0, 1) (44)
Using the ﬁrst order conditions, the elements of Hessian are
given as:
∂focq0
∂q0
= −n0c0(α0; t0)z′′(q0) < 0, (45)
∂focq0
∂q1
= hn0c1(α1; t1)z′(q1) > 0, (46)
∂focq1
∂q1
= −hn0(1− q0)c1(α1; t1)z′′(q1) < 0, (47)
∂focq1
∂q0
= hn0c1(α1; t1)z′(q1) > 0. (48)
Then we obtain the Hessian as:
H =
(
H11 H12
H21 H22
)
, (49)
where
H11 = −n0c0(α0; t0)z′′(q0),
H12 = hn0c1(α1; t1)z
′(q1),
H21 = hn0c1(α1; t1)z
′(q1),
H22 = −hn0(1− q0)c1(α1; t1)z′′(q1).
Since we are maximizing proﬁt, the sign of the determinant
of the Hessian has to be positive (det|H| > 0). Letting the
vector foc=(focq0 , focq1 ), we obtain:
∂foc
∂h
=
(
n0
(
c1(α1, t1)z(q1) + w(α1)
)
−n0(1− q0)c1(α1, t1)z′(q1)
)
, (50)
∂foc
∂t0
=
( −n0 ∂c0(α0,t0)∂t0 z′(q0)
0
)
, (51)
∂foc
∂t1
=
(
hn0
∂c1(α1,t1)
∂t1
z(q1)
−hn0(1− q0) c1(α1,t1)∂t1 z′(q1)
)
, (52)
∂foc
∂β0
=
(
−n0 ∂c0(α0,t0)∂β1 z′(q0)
0
)
, (53)
∂foc
∂β1
=
(
hn0
∂c1(α1,t1)
∂β1
z(q1)
−hn0(1− q0) c1(α1,t1)∂β1 z′(q1)
)
. (54)
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Let the vectors vars=(q0, q1). Then for each parameters,
∂vars
∂t
= H−1
∂foc
∂t
gives the following results.
sign
⎛
⎜⎝
∂q0
∂h
∂q1
∂h
⎞
⎟⎠ = ( < 0 or > 0
< 0 or > 0
)
. (55)
sign
⎛
⎜⎝
∂q0
∂t0
∂q1
∂t0
⎞
⎟⎠ = ( < 0
< 0
)
, (56)
sign
⎛
⎜⎝
∂q0
∂t1
∂q1
∂t1
⎞
⎟⎠ = ( < 0 or > 0
< 0 or > 0
)
, (57)
sign
⎛
⎜⎝
∂q0
∂β0
∂q1
∂β0
⎞
⎟⎠ = ( > 0> 0
)
, (58)
sign
⎛
⎜⎝
∂q0
∂β1
∂q1
∂β1
⎞
⎟⎠ = ( < 0 or > 0
< 0 or > 0
)
. (59)
Regarding the span of control SM =
n0
n1
=
1
h(1− q0) , we
obtain the following results of sign.
∂SM
∂h
= < 0 or > 0, (60)
∂SM
∂t0
= < 0, (61)
∂SM
∂t1
= < 0 or > 0, (62)
∂SM
∂β0
= > 0, (63)
∂SM
∂β1
= < 0 or > 0. (64)
B. Three Layers: Workers, Managers and Entrepreneurs
In this section we only conﬁrm the relationship between
managers and entrepreneurs.
The proﬁt maximization problem is speciﬁed as:
Π(2) = max[ql,nl,αl]2l=0 q2n0 − n2
(
c2(α2; t2)z(q2)
+ w(α2)
)− n1(c1(α1; t1)z(q1) + w(α1))
− n0
(
c0(α0; t0)z(q0) + w(α0)
)
(65)
subject to time constraints for the different layers of managers
and entrepreneurs,
hn0(1− q1) = n2 (66)
hn0(1− q0) = n1 (67)
Using (65)-(67), we obtain the ﬁrst order conditions as:
∂Π
∂q1
= h
(
c2(α2; t2)z(q2) + w(α2)
)
− h(1− q0)(c1(α1, t1)z′(q1) = 0 (focq1) (68)
∂Π
∂q2
= 1− h(1− q1)c2(α2; t2)z′(q2)
= 0, (focq2)(69)
∂Π
∂αi
= −ci(αi; ti)z(qi)− w′(αi) = 0.(i = 0, 1, 2)(70)
Using the ﬁrst order conditions, the elements of Hessian are
given as:
∂focq1
∂q1
= −h(1− q0)c1(α1; t1)z′′(q1) < 0 (71)
∂focq2
∂q2
= −h(1− q1)c2(α2; t2)z′′(q2) < 0 (72)
∂focq1
∂q2
= hc2(α2; t2)z
′(q2) > 0 (73)
∂focq2
∂q1
= hc2(α2; t2)z′(q2) > 0 (74)
Then we obtain the Hessian as:
H =
(
H11 H12
H21 H22
)
(75)
H11 = −h(1− q0)c1(α1; t1)z′′(q1),
H12 = hc2(α2; t2)z
′(q2),
H21 = hc2(α2; t2)z′(q2),
H22 = −h(1− q1)c2(α2; t2)z′′(q2).
Since we are maximizing proﬁt, the sign of the determinant
of the Hessian has to be positive (det|H| > 0). Letting the
vector foc=(focq1 , focq2 ), we obtain:
∂foc
∂h
=
⎛
⎝ c2(α2, t2)z(q2) + w(α2)−(1− q0)c1(α1, t1)z′(q1)
−(1− q1)c2(α2, t2)z′(q2)
⎞
⎠ (76)
∂foc
∂t1
=
⎛
⎝ −h(1− q0)∂c1(α1, t1)∂t1 z′(q1)
0
⎞
⎠ (77)
∂foc
∂t2
=
⎛
⎜⎝ h
∂c2(α1, t2)
∂t2
z(q2)
−h(1− q1)c2(α2, t2)
∂t2
z′(q2)
⎞
⎟⎠ (78)
∂foc
∂β1
=
⎛
⎝ −h(1− q0)∂c1(α1, t1)∂β1 z′(q1)
0
⎞
⎠ (79)
∂foc
∂β2
=
⎛
⎜⎝ h
∂c2(α2, t2)
∂β2
z(q2)
−h(1− q1)∂c2(α2, t2)
∂β2
z′(q2)
⎞
⎟⎠ (80)
Let the vectors vars=(q1, q2). Then for each parameters,
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∂vars
∂t
= H−1
∂foc
∂t
gives the following results.
sign
⎛
⎜⎝
∂q1
∂h
∂q2
∂h
⎞
⎟⎠ = ( < 0< 0
)
(81)
sign
⎛
⎜⎝
∂q1
∂t1
∂q2
∂t1
⎞
⎟⎠ = ( < 0< 0
)
(82)
sign
⎛
⎜⎝
∂q1
∂t2
∂q2
∂t2
⎞
⎟⎠ = ( < 0 or > 0
< 0 or > 0
)
(83)
sign
⎛
⎜⎝
∂q1
∂β1
∂q2
∂β1
⎞
⎟⎠ = ( > 0> 0
)
(84)
sign
⎛
⎜⎝
∂q1
∂β2
∂q2
∂β2
⎞
⎟⎠ = ( < 0 or > 0
< 0 or > 0
)
(85)
Regarding the span of control SM =
n0
n1
=
1
h(1− q0 and
SE =
1− q0
1− q1 for managers and entrepreneurs, we obtain the
following results of sign.
∂SM
∂h
= < 0 (86)
∂SE
∂h
= < 0 (87)
∂SM
∂t1
= 0 (88)
∂SE
∂t1
= < 0 (89)
∂SM
∂t2
= 0 (90)
∂SE
∂t2
= < 0 or > 0 (91)
∂SM
∂β1
= 0 (92)
∂SE
∂β1
= > 0 (93)
∂SM
∂β2
= 0 (94)
∂SE
∂β2
= < 0 or > 0 (95)
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